The European Union has finally recognised that democratic resilience is no longer simply a governance issue but a security imperative. The European Democracy Shield (EDS) reflects an important shift in thinking: foreign information manipulation, AI-driven disinformation, electoral interference and hybrid threats are now understood as challenges requiring a coordinated European response rather than fragmented national efforts. That recognition is both necessary and overdue.
Yet there is a risk that Europe is repeating a familiar pattern. Once again, much of the political debate has centred on building new frameworks, governance structures and coordination mechanisms, while paying far less attention to the people who actually defend democracy every day. Institutions matter, but democratic resilience ultimately depends on the individuals and organisations that expose corruption, investigate and counter disinformation, defend media freedom and hold those in power accountable.
When democracy comes under pressure, it is not a strategy paper or a newly created institution that responds first. It is investigative journalists who continue reporting despite intimidation, fact-checkers exposing coordinated manipulation campaigns, election observers documenting irregularities, anti-corruption watchdogs following public money, and local civil society organisations defending civic space when formal institutions begin to weaken. These actors are often described as stakeholders in democratic resilience. In reality, they have increasingly become part of Europe’s democratic infrastructure itself.
This distinction matters because Europe does not suffer from a shortage of democratic instruments. Over the past decade, the Union has developed an increasingly sophisticated toolbox to respond to democratic backsliding and information manipulation. The Rule of Law Framework, Article 7 proceedings, the Conditionality Regulation, infringement procedures, the Digital Services Act and the European Media Freedom Act all provide important mechanisms for protecting democratic standards. The Democracy Shield adds another important layer by seeking to improve coordination across these different areas.
The question, however, is no longer whether Europe possesses the necessary tools. It is whether it is prepared to use them consistently and at the moment when they can still make a difference.
Encouragingly, the report adopted in June by the European Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield recognises several of these shortcomings. Although the report still requires approval by the Parliament in plenary, currently expected during the September 2026 plenary sitting, it signals an important shift in emphasis. Instead of advocating another layer of legislation, it argues that the Union should focus on implementing and enforcing its existing democratic toolbox more effectively. It also calls for stronger support for independent journalism, civil society, fact-checking networks and cooperation with candidate countries. These recommendations point in the right direction. However, the ultimate success of the Democracy Shield will not be judged by the quality of its recommendations, but by whether they translate into timely political action when democratic actors come under pressure. Europe has become increasingly adept at diagnosing democratic decline; it now needs to demonstrate that it is equally capable of responding before the damage becomes irreversible.
That challenge cannot be overstated. Across Europe, there is a growing gap between the sophistication of our legal frameworks and the reality faced by those defending democracy on the ground. When journalists are harassed, activists investigated, watchdog organisations targeted or fact-checkers portrayed as enemies of the state, another carefully worded statement from Brussels offers little practical protection. What matters in those moments is sustained financial support, access to legal assistance, rapid-response mechanisms, political backing and visible European solidarity. These are often the factors that determine whether independent organisations can continue operating under pressure.
Lessons from Hungary and Central Europe
Hungary illustrates this challenge particularly well. For more than a decade, European institutions have documented concerns about democratic backsliding, shrinking media pluralism, judicial independence and the erosion of checks and balances. The problem has rarely been a lack of diagnosis. Instead, European action has often arrived only after the damage had already become deeply embedded. By the time infringement procedures conclude or court judgments are delivered, media ecosystems have already been transformed, universities relocated, watchdog organisations forced out and democratic institutions fundamentally weakened.
The most recent Hungarian election campaign demonstrated how these challenges have evolved in the age of artificial intelligence. Synthetic content, coordinated influence operations and increasingly opaque digital campaigning blurred the distinction between authentic political debate and manufactured narratives. Researchers described an information environment in which the objective was no longer necessarily to persuade citizens of a particular version of events but to overwhelm the public sphere with so many competing narratives that truth itself became increasingly difficult to identify. Throughout that process, it was not governments, digital platforms or European institutions that documented developments in real time. It was researchers, independent journalists, fact-checkers and civil society organisations working with only a fraction of the resources available to those conducting hybrid warfare and spreading disinformation.
This experience highlights perhaps the central unresolved question surrounding the European Democracy Shield. Europe’s democratic challenge is no longer primarily about designing better frameworks; it is about enforcing existing ones before democratic erosion becomes irreversible. The credibility of the Shield will therefore not be measured by the number of structures it creates, but by whether European institutions are prepared to intervene early, consistently and even when doing so is politically uncomfortable.
Another lesson from Central Europe is that Europe should resist treating democratic threats primarily as something that comes from outside its borders. Foreign interference from Russia, China and other authoritarian actors undoubtedly poses a serious challenge, and the Democracy Shield rightly seeks to strengthen Europe’s resilience against these threats. Yet some of the most damaging attacks on democratic integrity originate within our own political systems: the political capture of media, government officials spreading disinformation, the misuse of state resources during elections, pressure on civil society organisations, smear campaigns against journalists and the systematic delegitimisation of independent institutions. The murders of Daphne Caruana Galizia, Ján Kuciak, Giorgos Karaivaz and Peter R. de Vries remind us that attacks on those defending democracy are not distant problems. They are European problems.
Western Balkans
One of the more promising aspects of the committee’s report is its recognition that democratic resilience cannot stop at the EU’s external borders. This is particularly important for the Western Balkans, where foreign influence, domestic information manipulation and democratic backsliding intersect every day. Yet recognition alone is insufficient. Candidate countries cannot be included rhetorically while remaining outside the operational architecture of the Democracy Shield.
The Western Balkans remain one of Europe’s most exposed democratic frontlines. Civil society organisations, independent media, researchers and human rights defenders continue to document abuses, expose corruption, monitor elections and defend civic space under increasingly difficult conditions. In Serbia, for example, years of mass protests, attacks on journalists, restrictions on civic space and growing pressure on independent organisations have once again demonstrated that it is civil society, not governments, that carries much of the burden of democratic accountability.
Although candidate countries will not be fully covered by instruments such as the Digital Services Act or the European Media Freedom Act until accession, there is no reason why they cannot already become part of Europe’s broader democratic resilience architecture; what is more early alignment prior to accession should be strongly encouraged. Civil society organisations, fact-checkers, researchers and independent media across the region should be integrated into European early-warning systems, information-sharing mechanisms and resilience networks. The Union should invest in local-language monitoring, provide sustainable rather than project-based funding, strengthen protection mechanisms for journalists and activists and ensure that democratic actors from candidate countries help shape Europe’s response to information manipulation and democratic backsliding. Otherwise, the Democracy Shield risks leaving one of Europe’s most vulnerable democratic spaces outside its operational perimeter.
Ultimately, the European Democracy Shield has the potential to become one of the European Union’s most important democratic initiatives. But its success will not depend on how many new coordination mechanisms or governance structures it creates. It will depend on whether Europe is finally prepared to enforce the instruments it already possesses and to stand visibly behind the people who have defended democratic values long before the Democracy Shield existed.
Democracy is not defended primarily in Brussels. It is defended in newsrooms, courtrooms, classrooms, community centres, independent media organisations and civic groups across Europe. If the European Union truly wants to strengthen democratic resilience, it must invest not only in protecting institutions but also in protecting the people who make those institutions meaningful. Because if those people disappear, no democratic shield, however sophisticated, will be strong enough to protect European democracy.