On 28 January 2026, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted a package of five amendments to key judicial laws, widely referred to in the public as the “Mrdić’s Laws”, after their proposer, Uglješa Mrdić, a Member of Parliament from the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). President Aleksandar Vučić signed the laws on 30 January, and they entered into force on 7 February. These amendments introduce far-reaching changes that weaken institutional safeguards, centralise authority, and significantly limit the independence of Serbia’s judicial and prosecutorial system.
The hasty and non-transparent adoption
The adopted package includes amendments to key pillars of the judicial system of the Republic of Serbia, including legislation on the organization of courts, the public prosecution service, the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC), the status of judges, and the prosecution service for high-tech crime. Although presented by their proposer as a reform aimed at strengthening independence and improving efficiency, the content of the amendments, combined with the manner in which they were adopted, raised serious concerns that their practical effect will be the opposite.
The adoption process itself set the tone. Rather than being proposed by the Government and subjected to a structured public debate, the amendments were introduced by a Member of Parliament and adopted under an urgent procedure between 14 and 28 January 2026. No meaningful public consultation was conducted. Crucially, the High Judicial Council (VSS) and the High Prosecutorial Council (VST), constitutional bodies responsible for safeguarding judicial and prosecutorial independence, were not asked to provide opinions prior to adoption. This omission occurred at a particularly sensitive moment, as elections of members of the High Prosecutorial Council were ongoing, leaving the institution in transition and limiting its capacity to respond.
When reforms affect the very architecture of judicial independence, bypassing professional bodies and public debate is not a procedural technicality – it is a warning sign. Legislative changes of this magnitude require broad consultation, debate, consensus, transparency of the process, and, most importantly, expert input. Instead, the amendments were adopted swiftly, despite opposition from professional associations and segments of the legal community.
Concerns about judicial independence erosion
The most alarming changes concern the public prosecution service. The amendments significantly weaken the position of the Supreme Public Prosecutor by removing key competences, including aspects of international cooperation, and transferring them to the Ministry of Justice. This shift introduces a direct channel for executive oversight over prosecutorial activities. In systems based on the rule of law, prosecutorial independence is safeguarded precisely to prevent political interference in investigations, particularly in sensitive corruption or organized crime cases. Any mechanism that enables executive control over prosecutorial work risks undermining that principle.
At the same time, the amendments centralize authority within the prosecutorial hierarchy by strengthening the powers of chief public prosecutors, especially the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade. Internal safeguards are weakened, including the abolition of an independent commission within the High Prosecutorial Council responsible for deciding on prosecutors’ rights upon objections. The cumulative effect of these measures is a more vertical and concentrated structure, with fewer checks and reduced institutional pluralism.
Particularly concerning are the transitional provisions requiring the withdrawal of seconded prosecutors within 30 days of the law’s entry into force. This measure directly affects the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime (TOK), which is handling some of the most complex and sensitive cases in the country, including the ‘General Staff’ case involving Minister of Culture Nikola Selaković and proceedings related to the Novi Sad railway station canopy collapse involving former Ministers Goran Vesić and Tomislav Momirović, as well as organized crime cases. The sudden removal of experienced prosecutors during ongoing proceedings risks procedural disruption, delays, or even the collapse of cases. Professional associations have warned that such disruption represents a serious step backward in the fight against high-level corruption and organized crime, with defendants potentially benefiting from institutional instability.
The specialized Prosecution for High-Tech Crime is also fundamentally altered. The amendments foresee that this prosecution will no longer function as a distinct institutional entity but will instead become a department within the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade. While the reform is presented as an effort to increase efficiency and improve results, subordinating a specialized body to a centralized structure risks diminishing its operational autonomy and specialization in an area that demands technical expertise and independence.
Changes to the organization of courts further reinforce concerns about legislative motivations. The amendments divide the Third Basic Court in Belgrade into two separate courts, creating a new Fourth Basic Court with jurisdiction over Novi Beograd and Surčin. Although officially justified as an effort to align the judicial network with demographic and organizational realities, critics have pointed to the significance of Surčin as the location of major infrastructure projects linked to EXPO 2027, including the construction of the National Stadium. The absence of clear plans for additional judges or staff raises doubts about whether the objective is genuine efficiency or the redistribution and strategic allocation of future cases.
Additional provisions, such as the possibility of extending acting mandates of chief public prosecutors for up to three years and the re-election of court presidents, further contribute to concerns about the concentration of influence and prolonged temporary arrangements. Temporary appointments are meant to ensure continuity in exceptional circumstances; extending them risks creating dependency and weakening institutional stability. When viewed together, these measures signal a structural recalibration of the balance between independence and control within the judiciary.
Judiciary professionals fight back
Against this backdrop, public rhetoric surrounding the adoption of the laws has deepened concern. Statements suggesting that the reforms were prompted by ongoing investigations or potential arrests of ruling party officials reinforce the perception that the amendments may be reactive and politically motivated rather than systemically justified.
It is therefore not surprising that the adoption of “Mrdić’s laws” has triggered an unusually strong and unified response from the professional community. The Center for Judicial Research (CEPRIS), together with the Union of Judicial Authorities, the Association of Prosecutors of Serbia, the informal group “Defense of the Profession,” and with the support of the Bar Association of Serbia and the Belgrade Bar Association, will organize a public gathering titled “March for the Judiciary” on 21 February 2026 in Belgrade. The protest will be held under the banner of defending judicial independence, legality, and constitutionality, representing a significant societal and professional signal that the newly adopted laws are perceived as a serious threat to the rule of law.
The organizers emphasized that the amendments lower the level of achieved rights and procedural guarantees, strengthen political and executive influence over judges and prosecutors, and were adopted without public debate or professional consensus. The Bar Association’s decision to suspend work for three days and to call upon state authorities to repeal the adopted amendments further underscores the gravity of the moment. When judges, prosecutors, and lawyers collectively mobilize to defend institutional autonomy, it reflects not a routine policy disagreement but a fundamental concern about the direction of the justice system.
Beyond domestic criticism, the adopted amendments have also prompted concern at the European level. The European Commission publicly described the changes as a “serious step backwards” in Serbia’s EU accession process, warning that the new laws undermine judicial independence. It called on the Serbian authorities to suspend their implementation and to urgently review or revise the amendments through a transparent and inclusive process, including consultation with the Venice Commission and other relevant stakeholders.
Judicial independence is not a privilege of the judiciary; it is a fundamental safeguard for society as a whole. It protects not only individual citizens, but also businesses, investors, civil society organizations, media and public institutions – anyone who relies on the fair and impartial application of the law. An independent judiciary ensures that rights are protected, property is secure and disputes are resolved without political interference.
More broadly, judicial independence forms the backbone of a functioning rule-of-law state, ensuring that state power is exercised within legal limits, that public authorities are held accountable, and that no individual or institution stands above the law. Without these guarantees, legal certainty erodes, public trust declines, and democratic governance itself is weakened.
In this context, reforms that centralize power, weaken internal safeguards, or expand executive influence pose a serious risk to these foundational principles. The adoption of the “Mrdić’s laws” therefore marks a critical juncture. Whether they result in lasting institutional damage or instead prompt a renewed commitment to judicial autonomy will depend on their implementation – and on the continued vigilance of the professional community and the public, both domestically and internationally.